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America’s increasing environmental consciousness in the 1960s 
and 1970s led regulators to consider ways to further protect and 
enhance the nation’s air quality.1 A monumental step occurred when 
the Clean Air Act of 1970 (“CAA”) was enacted.2 A comprehensive 
statute, the Act was designed to “protect and enhance the quality of 
the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare and the productive capacity of its population . . . .”3 Despite 
the CAA’s enactment, pollutants, mostly smog and particulate 
 
 * © 2015 Heather M. Hillaker. 
 1. See Patricia Smith, 1970: Planet Earth Takes Center Stage, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT 
(Oct. 25, 2010) http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/upfront/features/index 
.asp?article=f102510_green; Gina DiTommaso, Key Environmental Issues in 1970, GLOBAL 
FOOTPRINT NETWORK, http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/newsletter/det/ 
the_rise_of_earth_day_key_environmental_issues_in_1970 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 
(2012)). 
 3. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2012) (Congressional Declaration of 
Purpose). 
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matter, continued to impair visibility in many cities,4 creating a 
concern for public health and a desire to protect pure natural areas, 
like national parks, from similar degradation. A divide between 
environmental advocates and industry supporters arose during 
discussions about how to appropriately address these continuing 
concerns. In response, Congress charged the industrial and 
environmental influences in the legislature with the difficult task of 
creating a solution that would alleviate the concerns of both sides. 
Congress eventually reached a solution, despite the industrial sector’s 
initial opposition to discussing proposed alterations to the CAA.5 The 
solution was the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) 
provision, which Congress enacted in the 1977 CAA Amendments.6 
The PSD provision regulates emissions from stationary sources into 
the ambient (outside) air.7 Congress designed the provision to ensure 
that attainment areas for a specific pollutant remained in attainment 
and that the area would not significantly deteriorate through the 
introduction of new emitting facilities.8 Thus, the provision both 
protects air quality and allows for industrial growth.9 It illustrates a 
compromise between the two sides of the debate by simultaneously 
advancing notions of economic development as well as environmental 
protection. For example, the PSD’s congressional statement of 
purpose includes the purpose of “insur[ing] that economic growth will 
occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air 
 
 4. See Smith, supra note 1; Particulate Matter (PM): Basic Information, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/air/particlepollution/basic.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2013). 
 5. See A. STANLEY MEIBURG, PROTECT AND ENHANCE: “JURIDICIAL 
DEMOCRACY” AND THE PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF AIR 
QUALITY 225–30 (1991); New Source Review, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org 
/features/new-source-review (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 6. The PSD provision allowed for the permitting of new sources of air pollution as 
long as the owner conducted the proper review and installed appropriate control 
technology to decrease their expected emissions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7479. 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470; Summary of the Clean Air Act, EPA.GOV, 
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act (last updated July 8, 2014). 
The CAA also regulates emissions from mobile sources. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7554. 
 8. Under the CAA, an area is in “attainment” if it “meets the national primary or 
secondary ambient air quality standards for the pollutant [at issue]” and is in 
“nonattainment” if it does not meet these standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (Congressional Declaration of Purpose). According to an EPA 
press release, issued by then-Administrator Douglas M. Costle, the PSD regulations were 
designed to “help insure that clean air areas of the country remain clean and will provide 
the States with a mechanism for accommodating industrial growth within these areas[.]” 
Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces New Rules on Industrial Growth in 
Clean Air Areas (June 13, 1978), http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-announces-new-
rules-industrial-growth-clean-air-areas (last updated May 23, 2014). 
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resources . . . .”10 The provision’s other stated purposes—the 
protection of public health and welfare, the preservation and 
enhancement of special national natural areas, and the assurance that 
the development of new sources of air pollution will not interfere with 
a state’s plan to meet federal air quality goals11—demonstrate that, 
despite this compromise, the CAA’s and PSD’s overarching purpose 
tilts in favor of environmental protection over economic growth. 
Despite the congressional intent for a balance between 
environmental and economic concerns, and even a preference for 
environmental protection, companies continue to build or modify 
facilities without complying with the PSD requirements.12 This is 
partially due to the high cost and time-intensive nature of 
compliance.13 Instead of complying with the PSD provision, facilities 
look for ways to circumvent the requirements of PSD, conceal 
potential violations, and advocate for revision or revocation of the 
PSD provision.14 The self-reporting nature of the PSD provision15 
 
 10. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (emphasis added). 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470. The purposes of this part are as follows: 
  (1) to protect public health and welfare from any actual or potential adverse 
effect which in the Administrator’s judgment may reasonably be anticipate[d] to 
occur from air pollution or from exposures to pollutants in other media, which 
pollutants originate as emissions to the ambient air, notwithstanding attainment 
and maintenance of all national ambient air quality standards; 
  (2) to preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality in national parks, national 
wilderness areas, national monuments, national seashores, and other areas of 
special national or regional natural, recreational, scenic, or historic value; 
  (3) to insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the 
preservation of existing clean air resources; 
  (4) to assure that emissions from any source in any State will not interfere 
with any portion of the applicable implementation plan to prevent significant 
deterioration of air quality for any other State; and 
  (5) to assure that any decision to permit increased air pollution in any area to 
which this section applies is made only after careful evaluation of all the 
consequences of such a decision and after adequate procedural opportunities for 
informed public participation in the decisionmaking process. 
Id. 
 12. See Bernard F. Hawkins, Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes, The New Source Review 
Program, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 125, 127 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. 
Zacaroli eds., 3d ed. 2011). 
 13. See MEIBURG, supra note 5, at 229. 
 14. See id. at 229–30; Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 12, at 127. There are several 
illegal and pseudo-illegal methods of eluding the requirements. For a full discussion, see 
Ivan Lieben, Catch Me if You Can – The Misapplication of the Federal Statute of 
Limitations to Clean Air Act PSD Permit Program Violations, 38 ENVTL. L. 667, 676–78 
(2008). 
 15. A facility is responsible for determining if their activity qualifies under PSD and, if 
it does, to submit a PSD permit application. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
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means that this concealment can frustrate Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) already daunting task of locating and bringing suit 
against violators.16 Failure to obtain a PSD permit and apply the 
proper control technology can result in hundreds of thousands of tons 
of illegal emissions.17 With high rates of non-compliance coupled with 
enforcement issues, the massive amounts of pollutants emitted by 
these sources cause “respiratory illness and heart disease, the 
formation of acid rain, [and] reduced visibility . . . .”18 
Due to the damaging health and environmental consequences of 
a facility’s failure to comply with the CAA’s PSD requirements, EPA 
has attempted to enforce compliance through its regulatory powers.19 
Despite these efforts, courts have increasingly limited EPA’s ability 
to use its CAA enforcement powers against PSD violators.20 
Moreover, courts appear to be disregarding the high level of 
deference generally granted to administrative agencies under 
Chevron v. NRDC.21 Specifically, a series of recent federal appellate 
court decisions have continued to both narrow the PSD provision and 
limit the scope of enforcement under the CAA. This narrowing 
undermines not only the PSD provision but also the CAA itself. 
Without proper enforcement, some of the “largest contributors of air 
pollution” in the United States will be free to emit22 pollutants such as 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, smog, particulate matter, carbon 
monoxide, and volatile organic compounds.23 
 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. Lieben, supra note 14, at 676–77. The required control technology for sources 
subject to PSD is the “best available control technology.” 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
 18. Air Enforcement, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/air-enforcement#nsr 
(last updated Sept. 2, 2014). 
 19. See generally id. (discussing EPA’s enforcement processes under the CAA). 
 20. See generally Larry Kane, A Triad of Recent Decisions Limit Enforcement of the 
Clean Air Act’s PSD Permit Requirement, BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL, LLP (Nov. 4, 
2013), http://www.bgdlegal.com/news/2013/11/04/air-quality-letter/a-triad-of-recent-decisions-
limit-enforcement-of-the-clean-air-act-s-psd-permit-requirement (discussing recent federal 
court cases “which, in varying degrees and somewhat inconsistently, establish limits on 
government enforcement of the preconstruction permit requirement of the Clean Air 
Act’s (CAA’s) Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program”). 
 21. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the doctrine set forth in Chevron, federal courts 
conduct a two-step analysis when dealing with an administrative agency’s interpretation of 
a statute that they are charged with implementing. Under Step One, the court asks 
whether Congress unambiguously addressed the precise issue. Id. at 842–43. If the answer 
is yes, then the court must adhere to the unambiguous intent of Congress. Id. If the answer 
is no—Congress was silent or ambiguous as to the precise issue—then the federal court 
should defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. Id. 
 22. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 669–70. 
 23. Air Enforcement, supra note 18. Some sources, with high rates of noncompliance 
with NSR/PSD include: coal-fired electric utility units (emitting 2/3 of sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
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This Comment argues that when courts fail to properly apply 
Chevron deference24 to EPA’s interpretation of the CAA’s PSD 
provision, their analyses undermine both the PSD provision and the 
purpose of the CAA, significantly diminishing EPA’s enforcement 
capabilities. Part I provides a historical overview of the CAA and the 
PSD provision, as well as the provision’s general framework. Part II 
discusses statute of limitations (“SOL”) concerns that have arisen in 
recent PSD cases. Specifically, this Part discusses whether a violation 
of the PSD provision is “continuing” or “one-time” for purposes of 
the SOL. This Part also considers the interactions between the 
continuing violation theory and injunctive relief. Part III provides a 
detailed analysis of the recent litigation and highlights logical flaws in 
the courts’ reasoning. After conducting a more thorough Chevron 
analysis, this part also discusses how the recent case law is 
undermining the provision. Finally, Part IV discusses the practical 
implications of the recent judicial trend concerning EPA’s 
enforcement capabilities. 
I.  THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
This Part creates a framework to analyze the recent circuit court 
decisions in United States v. Homer City25 and United States v. Midwest 
Generation.26 This Part begins by providing a brief overview of the 
history of the modern CAA and the impetus behind its enactment. 
Next, this Part introduces the PSD provision—discussing its creation 
 
and 1/3 of nitrogen oxide (NOx) in the U.S.); acid production plants (emitting thousands 
of tons of NOx, SO2, and sulfuric acid mist every year); glass manufacturing plants 
(emitting 200,000 tons per year of NOx, SO2, and particulate matter (PM)); cement 
manufacturing plants (emitting over 500,000 tons per year of NOx, SO2, and carbon 
monoxide (CO)); and petroleum refineries (emitting NOx, SO2, benzene, volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), and PM). Id. 
 24. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court 
created a two-step process to use when reviewing an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it is charged with implementing: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, . . . the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous . . . the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted); see infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text. 
 25. 727 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 26. 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013).  
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and the provision’s specific requirements. Together, this information 
provides an understanding of the underlying purpose and goals of 
both the CAA generally and the PSD provision specifically. 
A. Historical Overview 
Although air pollution statutes have existed since the 1950s, they 
have generally lacked meaningful protection and enforcement 
mechanisms.27 It was not until Congress enacted the modern CAA in 
197028 that real improvements in air quality protection were achieved. 
Several environmental disasters and increasing public concern over 
air pollution spurred Congress to act.29 During this time of heightened 
environmental consciousness, Congress enacted several other key 
environmental statutes,30 the nation celebrated its first Earth Day,31 
and the executive branch established EPA.32 Whereas previous air 
pollution schemes merely provided funds for scientific research, the 
CAA implemented its fundamental goal—improving air quality—
 
 27. Precursors to the Clean Air Act include the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, 
Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, the 1963 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 
and the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. The Air Pollution 
Control Act did not, in fact, actually control air pollution. Rather, the Act provided 
federal research money and technical assistance to states that wished to implement air 
pollution controls. See § 1, 69 Stat. at 322. Increasing concerns over air pollution in the 
1960s led to the enactment of the 1963 Clean Air Act, which provided for additional 
research and grant programs and directed the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (“HEW”) to take action to abate interstate air pollution. ROY S. BELDEN, CLEAN 
AIR ACT 5 (2d ed. 2011); see § 1, 77 Stat. at 392–93. A few years later, the first regulatory 
action to prevent air pollution was developed. See § 101, 81 Stat. at 485. The Air Quality 
Act of 1967, an amendment to the 1963 Clean Air Act, called for the creation of national 
air quality criteria to be followed by the states. Id. at § 107, 81 Stat. at 490–91. Despite 
these efforts, the Act, and its regional approach, were a “notable failure,” mainly due to 
state inaction and lack of enforcement. Paul G. Rogers, EPA History: The Clean Air Act 
of 1970, EPA.GOV (Jan.-Feb. 1990), http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-clean-air-
act-1970 (last updated Mar. 16, 2014) (discussing state inaction); see BELDEN, supra, at 6 
(discussing lack of enforcement). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401–7671q (2012)). 
 29. Rogers, supra note 27. 
 30. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370a (2012)) (enacted in 1970); Clean Water 
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (2012)). 
 31. Earth Day: The History of a Movement, EARTH DAY NETWORK, 
http://www.earthday.org/earth-day-history-movement (last visited Mar. 3, 2015) 
(discussing the first Earth Day, which was held on April 20, 1970, as an organized response 
to a 1969 oil spill in Santa Barbara, California). 
 32. Michael R. Barr, Introduction to the Clean Air Act: History, Perspective, and 
Direction for the Future, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 6. 
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through a stronger regulatory approach.33 For example, under the 
modern CAA, EPA was charged with creating National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (“NAAQS”),34 setting New Source Performance 
Standards for new and modified sources,35 and regulating Hazardous 
Air Pollutants.36 Together, these programs required states to comply 
with more rigorous standards. 
Most states failed to meet the stringent goals set by the 1970 
CAA.37 Notably, many states were unsuccessful in attaining the 
NAAQS.38 As a result, Congress enacted the 1977 Amendments to 
the CAA.39 These amendments divided the country into “attainment” 
and “nonattainment” areas, based on whether or not they met the 
NAAQS for each regulated pollutant.40 The 1977 amendments also 
created the PSD provision, which placed limitations on new and 
modified sources located in attainment areas.41 More recently, 
Congress amended the CAA again in 199042 and added several new 
provisions and programs, including the acid rain provisions, the Title 
V permit program, and the stratospheric ozone program.43 
 
 33. Id.  
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). The CAA requires EPA to set NAAQS for certain 
harmful pollutants, known as “criteria” pollutants. National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS), EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last updated Oct. 
21, 2014). There are two types of NAAQS—primary and secondary standards. Id. Primary 
standards are geared towards protecting the public health, whereas the secondary 
standards are geared towards protecting public welfare. Id. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. New Source Performance Standards are technology-based 
standards, applicable to certain categories of stationary sources. New Source Performance 
Standards and State Implementation Plans, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
monitoring/programs/caa/newsource.html (last updated June 13, 2012). These standards 
can be found at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2014). Id. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 7412. Hazardous Air Pollutants are toxic air pollutants “that cause or 
may cause cancer or other series health effects.” Pollutants and Sources, EPA.GOV, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttnatw01/pollsour.html (last updated Sept. 18, 2013). 
 37. BELDEN, supra note 27, at 7.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.; see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)).  
 40. Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 12, at 126. NAAQS are established for each 
criteria pollutant at a level requisite to protect public health and welfare. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409. Due to different potentials to harm public health and welfare, each criteria 
pollutant has a separate NAAQS. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), 
supra note 34 (providing a list of NAAQS for each criteria pollutant). 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7479. 
 42. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)) (amending the Clean Air Act of 1970). 
 43. See BELDEN, supra note 27, at 8. These new provisions are located at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7651–7651o (acid rain), §§ 7661–7661f (Title V), and §§ 7671–7671q (stratospheric 
ozone). 
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B. PSD’s Creation 
The creation of the PSD provision in the 1977 amendments 
created a monumental change to the environmental regulatory 
scheme. The PSD program is technically a subpart of the CAA’s New 
Source Review (“NSR”) program. The NSR program supports air 
quality goals by “focus[ing] on controlling and limiting the emissions 
of criteria pollutants” from major stationary sources that have a 
“potential to emit” significant levels of CAA regulated pollutants.44 
NSR has three subparts, which depend on the source’s size and 
location: (1) PSD, applicable to major sources in attainment areas; (2) 
nonattainment NSR, applicable to major sources in nonattainment 
areas; and (3) minor NSR programs, applicable to minor sources in all 
areas.45 
PSD was initially created through judicial interpretation of the 
CAA.46 In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,47 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) 
interpreted the CAA’s stated goal—to “protect and enhance” air 
quality—to include a requirement to prevent the “significant 
deterioration” of air quality, even in areas which have attained the 
national standards, or NAAQS.48 This holding created the initial PSD 
requirement that states must include in their State Implementation 
Plans (“SIPs”)49—preconstruction review requirements for new and 
 
 44. See Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 12, at 136. 
 45. Id. at 125. 
 46. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 255–56 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(interpreting the phrase “protect and enhance,” found in the statute’s declaration of 
purpose). 
 47. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Environmentalists brought the case seeking to 
prevent EPA from promulgating regulations which would allow for degradation of clean 
air areas. Id. at 253. 
 48. See id. at 256 (emphasis added). The court stated that part of EPA’s regulation 
demonstrates “the Administrator’s doubts as to his authority to impose” a policy which 
would require states, in their State Implementation Plans (SIPs), to provide for 
“nondegradation of clean air.” Id. Furthermore, the court concluded that  
[h]aving considered the stated purpose of the Clean Air Act of 1970, the legislative 
history of the Act and its predecessor, and the past and present administrative 
interpretation of the Acts, it is our judgment that the Clean Air Act of 1970 is 
based in important part on a policy of non-degradation of existing clean air . . . . 
Id. 
 49. SIPs are plans created by the states that demonstrate how the state will meet the 
NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2012). 
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modified sources located in attainment areas.50 Two years later, in 
response to Ruckelshaus, EPA enacted PSD regulations.51 
The purpose of PSD is to ensure that attainment areas for a 
specific pollutant remain in attainment and that areas do not 
significantly deteriorate through the introduction of new emitting 
facilities to the area.52 This both protects air quality and allows for 
industrial growth. To reach this dual goal, the provision requires 
companies to set emission limitations and standards for new major 
sources or major modifications using “state-of-the-art pollution 
control technologies.”53 The required pollution control technology is 
known as the “best available control technology” (“BACT”).54 
Congress grandfathered existing sources into the new PSD 
regime.55 It made this decision based primarily on public policy 
concerns, including the high costs of retrofitting existing facilities and 
the desire to “avoid penalizing operators that entered into contracts 
to construct facilities prior to the promulgation of the NSR 
regulations.”56 Congress did not intend to permanently exclude these 
sources.57 Instead, Congress believed that within a decade or so, most 
of these existing sources would either be out of operation or be forced 
to make major modifications in order to continue operating and that 
 
 50. Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 12, at 126. 
 51. See Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec. 
5, 1974) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2014)). The 1977 Amendments eventually codified 
many of the requirements of the 1974 EPA regulations. See BELDEN, supra note 27, at 54. 
Because the new statutory PSD provision was not completely in line with the existing 
regulations, EPA enacted new PSD regulations in 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) 
(amending 40 C.F.R. parts 51, 52, and 124). See generally 45 Fed. Reg. at 52,679 (providing 
a general overview of the progression of PSD rules and regulations up until the 1980 
regulations). Although there were some changes to the PSD regulations in 2002, they are 
outside the scope of this paper, and this Comment will thus rely solely on the 1980 
regulations. Some of the 2002 regulations included emission increase calculations, baseline 
emissions calculations, and plant-wide applicability limitations. BELDEN, supra note 27, at 
54. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (Congressional Declaration of Purpose). According to an EPA 
press release, issued by then-Administrator Douglas M. Costle, the PSD regulations would 
“help insure that clean air areas of the country remain clean and will provide the States 
with a mechanism for accommodating industrial growth within these areas . . . .” Press 
Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 9. 
 53. BELDEN, supra note 27, at 53. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
 55. Hawkins & Ternes, supra note 12, at 140. 
 56. Id.  
 57. See William S. Eubanks II, The Clean Air Act’s New Source Review Program: 
Beneficial to Public Health or Merely a Smoke-and-Mirrors Scheme?, 29 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 361, 364 (2009).  
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the PSD regulations would attach at that time.58 Therefore, Congress 
initially intended that, within a decade or so, the underlying goals of 
PSD and its statutory requirements would be applied to all major 
stationary sources.59 
C. PSD Requirements 
Although the PSD provision has a relatively simple purpose, the 
specific statutory and regulatory requirements are quite complex. The 
main statutory requirements are located in § 7475(a) of the CAA, 
which sets forth eight separate requirements that must be completed 
before constructing or modifying a major stationary source of air 
pollution.60 In particular, the statute mandates that “[n]o major 
emitting facility . . . may be constructed . . . unless: (1) a permit has 
been issued . . . setting forth emission limitations; . . . [and] (4) the 
proposed facility is subject to best available control technology for 
each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act emitted from, or 
which results from, such facility.”61 Accordingly, a facility must fulfill 
 
 58. Id. (citing Rachel H. Cease, Adverse Health Impacts of Grandfathered Power 
Plants and the Clean Air Act: Time to Teach Old Power Plants New Technology, 17 J. NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 157, 162–63 (2002–2003)) (“Based on the typical forty-year 
lifespan of a coal-fired facility, Congress anticipated that many existing plants would be 
upgraded within a reasonable time after 1977 to reduce their harmful air pollutants. 
Congress further expected that at the time of these upgrades, NSR would be triggered and 
the facilities would either be retired from service or would be fitted with the best available 
control technology existing at that time.”). 
 59. See id. 
 60. Section 7475 is structured to provide a subsection (a), which is then followed by 
eight separate subparagraphs numbered one through eight. New York v. Niagara Mohawk 
Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 650, 664–65 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). If the BACT requirement was 
intended to be subsumed under the permit requirement, then the statute would have been 
constructed accordingly. For example, Congress could have written the BACT 
requirement as an additional subparagraph under (a)(1) (i.e., 7475(a)(1)(i)). See id. 
(stating that if § 7475(a)(1) “encompass[ed] the requirements that a facility be subject to 
BACT set forth in § 7475(a)(4) would make § 7475(a)(4) superfluous. Absent a clear 
Congressional command otherwise, statutes are not to be construed in ‘any way that 
makes some of its provisions surplusage.’ ” (citation omitted)); see also Sierra Club v. 
Dairyland Power Coop., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112817, at *12–13 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 22, 
2010) (“[T]he individual requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) ‘are not subsumed by the 
initial requirement to obtain a preconstruction permit.’ ”) (citing Niagara Mohawk, 263 F. 
Supp. 2d at 664). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). The provision is as follows: 
No major emitting facility on which construction is commenced . . . may be 
constructed . . . unless: (1) a permit has been issued . . . setting forth emission 
limitations . . . ; (2) the proposed permit has been subject to review in accordance 
with this section . . . ; (3) the owner or operator of such facility 
demonstrates . . . that emissions from construction or operation of such facility will 
not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of . . . [NAAQS] . . . ; (4) the 
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several requirements, including both obtaining a permit and installing 
BACT, before it can begin construction on a new source.62 
The PSD requirements apply “to the construction of any new 
major stationary source.”63 A facility is a “major stationary source” if 
it falls within one of the twenty-six listed categories of sources and 
emits or has the potential to emit one hundred tons or more of any 
regulated pollutant per year.64 The law also considers a facility not 
among the listed categories as a major stationary source if it emits, or 
has the potential to emit, two hundred fifty tons per year or more of 
any regulated pollutant.65 Constructions subject to PSD requirements 
also include “modifications,”66 defined as “any physical change in, or 
change in the method of operation” that results in a significant net 
increase of air emissions.67 The law exempts a physical change or 
change in the method of operation from the definition of major 
modification if it is merely “routine maintenance, repair and 
replacement.”68 
The PSD-permitting provision states that a permit must be 
obtained before actual construction or modification begins on an 
 
proposed facility is subject to best available control technology for each pollutant 
subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from, or which results from, such 
facility; (5) the provisions of subsection (d) . . . have been complied with for such 
facility; (6) there has been an analysis of any air quality impacts projected for the 
area as a result of growth associated with such a facility; (7) the person who owns 
or operates . . . [a qualified] facility . . . agrees to conduct such monitoring as may 
be necessary to determine the effect which emissions from any such facility may 
have . . . on air quality . . . ; and (8) in the case of a source which proposes to 
construct in a class III area . . . the Administrator has approved the determination 
of [BACT] . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. See id.  
 63. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2) (2014). 
 64. § 52.21(b)(1)(i)(a). 
 65. § 52.21(b)(1)(i)(b). 
 66. § 52.01(d). 
 67. Id. 
 68. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(a). The regulations further state that modifications do not trigger 
compliance if they constitute “[m]aintenance, repair, and replacement which the 
Administrator determines to be routine for a source category, subject to the provisions of 
paragraph (c) of this section and § 60.15.” Id. Although there is no regulatory definition of 
the term “routine,” EPA’s narrow interpretation of the exception has generally been 
upheld. See United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 829, 854–55 (E.D. Ohio 2003) 
(discussing the deference given to EPA’s interpretation in Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 
893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)). Accordingly, the routine maintenance and repair 
exception is determined “on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature, extent, 
purpose, frequency and cost of the activity.” Id. at 850. 
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applicable source.69 Actual construction or modification begins at the 
“initiation of physical on-site construction activities on an emissions 
unit which are of a permanent nature.”70 To obtain a permit, the 
owner or operator must demonstrate that the proposed construction 
(1) will not have an adverse impact on air quality and (2) will employ 
BACT for every regulated pollutant that the source has the potential 
to emit in significant amounts.71 
Additionally, the PSD provision requires installation of a control 
technology called BACT.72 BACT is “an emissions 
limitation . . . based on the maximum degree of reduction for each 
pollutant subject to regulation under [the] Act,” to be determined “on 
a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and 
economic impacts and other costs . . . .”73 Section 52.21(j) is dedicated 
to “control technology review,” and reiterates the separate BACT 
requirement found in § 7475(a)(4) of the CAA by stating that “[a] 
new major stationary source [and a major modification] shall apply 
[BACT] for each regulated NSR pollutant that it would have the 
potential to emit in significant amounts.”74 The term “shall,” as used 
in the regulation, places a mandatory requirement on facilities to 
install BACT in order to comply with the CAA’s PSD provision.75 
This regulatory mandate is not linked to or subsumed under a rule 
requiring a facility to apply for a PSD permit.76 This emphasis 
indicates that installing BACT is a mandatory requirement for PSD 
compliance, separate from any other PSD requirement—including 
the requirement to apply for a PSD permit. 
Section 7477 provides for the enforcement of PSD requirements 
by mandating that EPA “shall . . . take such measures, including 
issuance of an order, or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary to 
prevent the construction or modification of a major emitting facility 
 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iii) (“No new major 
stationary source or major modification . . . shall begin actual construction without a 
permit that states that the major stationary source or major modification will meet those 
requirements.”). 
 70. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(11). 
 71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1) (stating that the permit must “set[] forth emission 
limitations for such facility which conform to the requirements” of the provision). 
 72. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. § 52.21(j)(2)–(j)(3) (emphasis added). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See generally id. § 52.21 (setting forth independent requirements—subsection (a) 
through subsection (cc)). There is no mention of a permit requirement in the independent 
subsection setting forth the mandatory BACT requirements. See id. § 52.21(j). 
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which does not conform to the requirements of” the CAA.77 
Furthermore, EPA has general enforcement capabilities against 
violators of any CAA requirement78: EPA may issue an 
administrative penalty order, issue an order requiring compliance, 
bring a civil action, or request that the Attorney General commence a 
criminal action.79 Therefore, by its terms, the CAA appears to grant 
EPA a wide array of enforcement tools it can use against facilities 
that violate the above requirements by failing to apply for a PSD 
permit or neglecting to install a BACT prior to construction. 
Although the CAA in its entirety is an intricate and technical 
statute, PSD is considered “among the most complex [programs] in all 
of government.”80 This Part briefly explained the CAA’s history and 
the PSD provision’s creation. Additionally, it provided a framework 
for this Article’s analysis by introducing the substance and specific 
requirements of the provision. 
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONCERNS 
One of the overarching issues in the recent PSD case law 
concerns the federal statute of limitations (“SOL”).81 For many PSD 
violations, enforcement under the statute hinges on whether the SOL 
has already run, thereby barring relief, or whether an exception to the 
SOL applies, tolling the clock past the SOL period. This Part begins 
by explaining such an exception—the continuing violation theory—
and the recent judicial interpretation of its application to PSD 
violations. Next, this Part discusses the implications of these 
interpretations on EPA’s ability to obtain injunctive relief. 
A. Continuing violation Theory 
An important aspect of recent PSD violation cases involves 
whether the case is barred by the federal five-year SOL. This question 
turns on whether the violation falls under the continuing violation 
 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 7477. 
 78. See id. § 7413 (stating that if EPA finds someone who has violated a requirement 
or prohibition of the CAA, EPA may issue an administrative penalty, issue an order 
requiring compliance, bring a civil action, or request a criminal action be brought). 
 79. Id. § 7413(3). 
 80. MEIBURG, supra note 5, at 16. 
 81. Because the CAA itself does not contain a statute of limitations, courts have 
applied the federal five-year period. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (“Except as otherwise 
provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil 
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless 
commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued . . . .”). 
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theory.82 This theory acts as an exception to the SOL by stating that 
the SOL does not apply if the violation is ongoing.83 In essence, an 
ongoing violation is a violation that continues to occur every day until 
the issue is rectified.84 Therefore, under the continuing violation 
theory, the SOL renews each day that the violation continues. 
Conversely, if courts do not consider PSD violations ongoing in 
nature, the SOL begins to run once construction commences without 
a PSD permit and does not renew each day. 
Recent judicial interpretations of PSD have focused on whether 
failures to obtain a PSD permit and install BACT constitute a 
“continuing violation” for purposes of the SOL.85 Although there has 
been some split between the circuits, and even inconsistencies within 
the same circuit, courts are increasingly answering this question in the 
negative.86 Relying on statutory construction and interpretations that 
often do not reflect the provision’s purpose,87 these courts have held 
that PSD violations, for purposes of the SOL, are one-time violations 
and are therefore barred if brought over five years after construction 
commenced.88 So far, courts in ten federal circuits have addressed the 
 
 82. See supra note 81. 
 83. See Michael J. Cole, Article, A Blueprint for EPA: How the Agency Can 
Overcome the Statute of Limitations When Enforcing PSD Under the Clean Air Act, 31 
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 181, 184 (2011). 
 84. See United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2013), 
reh’g & reh’g en banc denied (“The continuing violation argument is that every day a plant 
operates without a § 7475 permit is a fresh violation of the Clean Air Act.”). 
 85. The Continuing violation Doctrine essentially acts as an exception to the statute 
of limitations—the SOL does not apply if the violation is ongoing in nature. Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 (1982). Since the doctrine only applies to 
violations that are ongoing in nature, the interpretation of whether a doctrine has 
operational requirements—as is the debate in PSD cases—is paramount to this decision. 
See New York v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660 (W.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that failure to obtain a PSD permit is not continuing, and differentiating 
between “continual unlawful acts” and “continual ill effects from a single violation”). 
 86. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (one-time violation). But see infra note 
91 and accompanying text (continuing violation). 
 87. See infra Part III.B. An example of these inconsistent interpretations is the 
Seventh Circuit’s assertion that, under the statutory requirements of PSD, a facility could 
install BACT and then rip it out or deactivate it once construction was complete, without 
violating § 7475. Midwest Generation, 720 F.3d at 647. It is hard to imagine how a statute 
meant to protect air quality and a provision meant to ensure that clean air remains clean in 
light of industrial growth are consistent with an interpretation that merely requires the act 
of installing the control technology (which does not have any effect until operation 
commences) without a subsequent requirement that the control technology be used to 
actually control air emissions. 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 289 
(3d Cir. 2013); Midwest Generation, 720 F.3d at 647. 
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continuing violation and SOL questions.89 District courts in six 
circuits have held that PSD violations constitute a one-time 
violation,90 while district courts in five circuits have held these 
violations to be ongoing.91 The most recent cases, however, have 
taken place at the circuit court level. Prior to the summer of 2013, 
only three circuits—the Sixth, Eleventh, and Eighth—had decided the 
issue. The Sixth Circuit, relying partially on Tennessee’s SIP 
provisions, held that PSD violations were continuing in nature and 
therefore not barred by the SOL.92 Conversely, the Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits found the PSD violations to constitute one-time 
violations.93 During the summer of 2013, however, the Third and 
Seventh Circuits weighed in on the issue, holding that the violations 
are one-time occurrences.94 
 
 89. The continuing violation question has been addressed by courts (either district or 
appellate) in the following circuits: Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh. See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 90. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk, 263 F. Supp. 2d 650 (W.D.N.Y.); Ogden Projects, Inc. 
v. New Morgan Landfill Co., Inc., 911 F. Supp. 863, 876 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Third Circuit); 
United States v. Westvaco Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 439, 444 (D. Md. 2001) (Fourth Circuit); 
United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1083–84 (W.D. Wis. 2001) 
(Seventh Circuit); United States v. Campbell Soup Co., No. CIV–S–95–1854 DFL, 1997 
WL 258894, *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1997) (Ninth Circuit); United States v. La.-Pacific 
Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1122, 1129 (D. Colo. 1987) (Tenth Circuit). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy, 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 650 (M.D.N.C. 2003) 
(Fourth Circuit), vacated on other grounds, 549 U.S. 561, 566 (2007); United States v. 
Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1360 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating, without holding, that 
there were “continuing violations of environmental laws,” including the CAA’s PSD 
provision); United States v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (S.D. 
Ohio 2001) (Sixth Circuit); Sierra Club v. Dairyland Power Coop., No. 10-cv-303-bbc, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112817, at *2–3 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 22, 2010) (Seventh Circuit); United 
States v. CEMEX Cal. Cement, LLC, No. EDCV07-223-GW(JCRx), slip op. at 1 (C.D. 
Cal. July 10, 2007) (Ninth Circuit).  
 92. See Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. TVA, 480 F.3d 410, 418–19 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that the language found in the PSD BACT requirement “creates an ongoing 
obligation to apply BACT”). 
 93. See Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d 1008, 1014 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(applying the PSD analysis to the citizen suit provision of the CAA); Nat’l Parks 
Conservation Ass’n v. TVA, 502 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[V]iolations of the 
preconstruction permitting requirements occur at the time of construction, not on a 
continuing basis.” (citation omitted)). 
 94. In what can only be described as a terse and relatively hostile (or at least 
contemptuous) opinion, the Seventh Circuit led the way in what this Comment refers to as 
the “recent” PSD case law on the issue. See United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 
720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013). The case dealt with a company (Commonwealth Edison Co.) 
that modified five coal-fired power plants between the years of 1994 and 1999 without first 
obtaining a PSD permit or installing BACT. Id. at 645. However, a PSD suit was not 
brought against the facility until 2009 at which point the facility had already been sold to 
Midwest Generation. Id. at 646. Without reference to EPA’s longstanding interpretations 
of the PSD requirements and subsequently the application of Chevron deference, the 
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One-time violation courts generally rely on the fact that a PSD 
permit is referred to as a “pre-construction permit.”95 Therefore, the 
requirements are only applicable before construction and the SOL 
begins to run once a source commences construction without 
obtaining a permit.96 It is important to note that these cases, although 
recognizing the PSD BACT requirement, interpret BACT as merely 
a part of the permitting requirement, not a separate requirement of 
its own.97 Accordingly, BACT is subsumed under the permit 
requirement and does not impose obligations on a facility unless a 
permit has been issued. Consequently, the one-time violation 
conclusion—and the analysis used to support it—encourages facilities 
to continue operating in violation of PSD so long as they can evade 
 
court held that failure to obtain a PSD permit was a one-time violation and was therefore 
barred by the SOL. Id. at 648. Answering the successor-liability issue, the court stated that 
“Midwest cannot be liable when its predecessor in interest would not have been liable had 
it owned the plants continuously.” Id. at 646. Chief Judge Easterbrook’s opinion quickly 
became infamous among EPA and environmental scholars, due in part to its apparent 
application of the SOL to injunctive relief (discussed in detail below) and partially to 
several illogical and somewhat dubious assertions made by the court including: “If the 
owners ripped out or deactivated the best available control technology after finishing 
construction that would not violate § 7475,” and “once the statute of limitations expired, 
Commonwealth Edison was entitled to proceed as if it possessed all required construction 
permits.” Id. at 647–48. 
  After the confusion and concern created by Midwest Generation, EPA Region 4 
hoped that the upcoming Third Circuit decision in United States v. Homer City would 
contradict the Seventh Circuit or, at the very least, shed some light on the decision in 
Midwest Generation. Unfortunately for EPA, the court—agreeing with the Seventh 
Circuit—held a PSD violation to be one-time. United States v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 284 (3d Cir. 2013). Similar to Midwest Generation, this case 
involved a past owner or operator who made modifications to a coal-fired power plant 
without obtaining a PSD permit or installing BACT. Id. at 277. Likewise, EPA did not file 
suit until over a decade after the alleged violations occurred and the facility had 
subsequently been sold to a successor company. Id. Although containing a similar fact 
pattern and conclusion as the Seventh Circuit, Homer City is essential to this debate 
because it—unlike Midwest Generation—actually contained a full and detailed analysis of 
the court’s decision making process. See infra Part III. 
 95. See, e.g., Homer City, 727 F.3d at 284 (stating that the statute “does not exactly try 
to hide its exclusive link to construction” because “after all, the section is titled 
‘Preconstruction Requirements’ ”); Midwest Generation, 720 F.3d at 647 (“Section 7475 
bears the caption ‘Preconstruction requirements’ . . . .”); United Sates v. Westvaco Corp., 
144 F. Supp. 2d 439, 444 (D. Md. 2001) (highlighting the title of the provision). 
 96. Lieben, supra note 14, at 670. 
 97. See, e.g., Homer City, 727 F.3d at 287 (“The BACT requirement is simply part of 
§ 7475’s prohibition on construction—not operation.”); Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power 
Co., 615 F.3d 1008, 1016–17 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The context of [40 C.F.R.] § 52.21(j)(3) 
shows that the command to apply BACT is not a freestanding requirement. Rather, it is 
tied specifically to the construction process.”); see also infra note 175. 
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EPA detection until the SOL has run.98 Furthermore, for reasons 
discussed below, running the SOL from the time that construction 
commences “delivers a blow to one of the key enforcement tools of 
the CAA”99—the PSD provision. The requirement that EPA discover 
violations and bring suits within five years further exacerbates the 
practical limitations on EPA’s ability to enforce PSD requirements.100 
B. Application to Injunctive Relief 
The most concerning aspect of the recent PSD cases is their 
application of the SOL to injunctive relief. Due to the conclusion that 
PSD violations are one-time violations for purposes of the SOL, some 
courts have implied101 that the SOL applies to injunctive relief as well 
as to civil penalties.102 Until Midwest Generation and Homer City, the 
SOL in PSD cases only barred EPA’s collection of civil penalties.103 
At minimum, injunctive relief under PSD means the installation and 
operation of BACT or a change in process that results in the emission 
 
 98. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 671 (stating that the one-time violation conclusion 
“send[s] the wrong message to violators that they can get a ‘free pass’ on penalties if they 
can escape detection for long enough”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See infra Part IV. 
 101. Based on the Seventh and Third Circuits’ holdings, it is unclear whether the SOL 
does bar injunctive relief as well as civil penalties. See infra note 102. However, the fact 
that the courts did not grant EPA’s request for injunctive relief in both cases opens the 
door for facilities in future litigation to claim that the SOL does bar injunctive relief. The 
issue is further complicated by the fact that both cases dealt with successor liability—EPA 
was suing the former owner (company that initially violated PSD) and the current owner 
(company that purchased the facility). See supra note 94. EPA will likely argue that these 
cases can be distinguished on that basis. However, not only are successor issues prominent 
in many of the PSD cases where the SOL is an issue, this rationale would also allow 
companies to escape their liability and the liability of successor corporations by simply 
selling the facility after constructing the facility in violation of PSD, essentially allowing 
for unpermitted and uncontrolled emissions for the remainder of the facility’s life. See 
infra Part III.C. 
 102. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 289 (3d Cir. 
2013) (stating that EPA cannot obtain injunctive relief against successor companies if the 
violation occurred over five years ago). See generally United States v. Midwest 
Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013) (implying throughout that the SOL applies 
to injunctive relief by failing to grant EPA’s request for it). 
 103. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 670–71 (acknowledging that cases holding that PSD 
violations are one-time only “still recognize the availability of injunctive relief” and stating 
that courts have universally held that the concurrent-remedy doctrine cannot be used to 
bar injunctive relief claims by the government (citations omitted)); Julie Martin, Note, 
Enforcement for Construction Without PSD Permit and BACT Compliance, 16 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 563, 614 (2008) (“Even if civil penalties are barred by the statute of 
limitations, most courts agree that injunctive relief may still be awarded since suits by the 
government or citizens are grounded in concerns about the public interest.”). 
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reductions equivalent to BACT.104 If, however, a facility fails to 
obtain a PSD permit and its actual, post-construction emissions 
exceeds the major-source threshold, then injunctive relief is likely to 
include full compliance with the PSD provision.105 
Courts uniformly have held that (1) an injunction is not punitive 
and therefore not a penalty; and (2) the concurrent-remedy doctrine 
does not bar injunctive relief claims by the U.S. government when 
acting in its official enforcement capacity.106 Similarly, EPA has 
always operated according to the belief that the federal five-year SOL 
does not bar injunctive relief.107 Nonetheless, in Midwest Generation, 
the Seventh Circuit’s cursory opinion failed to discuss EPA’s claim 
for injunctive relief.108 However, the court completely denied EPA 
relief when EPA was seeking both penalties and an injunction.109 It 
can be inferred from these facts that the court at least implied an 
application of the SOL to injunctive relief.110 The subsequent decision 
in Homer City failed to add much clarity to the SOL issue, as the 
decision was unclear and somewhat contradictory. For instance, the 
Third Circuit qualified its assertion that injunctive relief was available 
by stating that if five years have passed since the end of construction 
and the facility has new owners, “the [CAA] protects [the new 
owners’] reasonable investment expectations.”111 The Third Circuit’s 
assertion is based on the interpretation that injunctive relief may only 
 
 104. Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer, Dir., Envtl. Prot. Agency Office of 
Regulatory Enforcement, 2 n.4 (Nov. 17, 1998), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/documents/nsrinjrelief.pdf. 
 105. Id. at 3. 
 106. Lieben, supra note 14, at 683 n.105. Under the concurrent-remedy doctrine, 
“when the equity jurisdiction of the federal court is concurrent with that at law, or the suit 
is brought in aid of a legal right, equity will withhold its remedy if the legal right is barred 
by the local statute of limitations.” Paul Wierenga, Effective Clean Air Act Enforcement in 
the Face of Statute-of-Limitations and Successor Liability Barriers, 43 ELR 10607, 10614 
(July 2013) (quoting Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940)). An exception to the 
doctrine, providing that “when the government seeks equitable relief in its enforcement 
capacity, the government is not subject to the time limitations unless Congress explicitly 
imposes one,” has subsequently been applied to the CAA. Id. 
 107. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 22–23, United States v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 11-4407, 11-4406, 11-4408), 2013 WL 
595144 at *22–23 (“The five-year statute of limitations applies only to penalty claims, not 
injunctive relief.”). 
 108. See generally United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 
2013) (failing to discuss injunctive relief). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See supra note 102.  
 111. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 289 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
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be “forward-looking” and therefore “must be limited to ongoing 
violations.”112 
In comparison, the courts’ analysis of CAA liability for current 
versus past owners and operators is distinct from Congress’s approach 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).113 CERCLA, enacted after the 
CAA,114 is useful to this analysis because it demonstrates the absence 
of congressional intent to allow certain loopholes for current owners 
of a facility.115 CERCLA imposes strict liability for current owners or 
operators of a contaminated site regardless of whether they actually 
contributed to the harm.116 The statute does, however, provide an 
exception for “innocent” purchasers, so long as they conducted due 
diligence before purchasing the property.117 Although the statute and 
case law do not address such an exception for PSD, there is a 
plausible argument for a similar application of an innocent purchaser 
exemption. A reasonable purchaser or new operator should conduct 
an investigation to determine if the facility is in compliance with all 
major federal laws, including the CAA. Without a due diligence 
requirement, new owners can facilitate a former owner’s escape from 
liability by purchasing the facility without inquiry into any potential 
statutory violations. Simultaneously, the new owners will be ensuring 
that they will not face liability for the former owner’s violation. 
Consequently, failure to conduct this due diligence should be 
considered a violation, or at the very least, act as a bar to an 
“innocent owner” defense.118 This defense is especially relevant in 
situations where the failure to conduct due diligence leads to the 
running of the SOL, thereby forever barring a claim against the 
current or past owners or operators. For example, according to the 
one-time violation courts, once a facility has been sold, injunctive 
relief can no longer be sought against the former owner because he or 
she no longer owns the facility, and at the same time, the new owners 
cannot be liable for a violation they did not commit. This large 
loophole allows facilities to potentially escape liability. A due 
 
 112. Id. at 292–93. 
 113. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
 114. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9675 (2012)). 
 115. See infra Part III.A. 
 116. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 117. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
 118. See United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(stating that the current owner or operation “cannot be liable when its predecessor in 
interest would not have been liable had it owned the plants continuously”). 
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diligence requirement would close the loophole by forcing new 
owners to properly investigate and, in good faith, assert that the 
facility is not violating the CAA in order to escape liability as a new 
or current owner. 
III.  RECENT LITIGATION 
Despite EPA’s reliance on the continuing violation theory 
discussed in Part II, recent court cases have interpreted the PSD 
provision in an increasingly narrow manner.119 This Part begins by 
providing an overview of the narrowing case law—focusing on the 
reasoning and conclusions of the one-time violation courts. Next, the 
following subpart attempts to refute these conclusions and highlight 
flaws in the courts’ reasoning. This Part’s analysis of the courts’ 
questionable interpretations is somewhat brief due to the well-
established literature on the topic.120 Instead, this Comment focuses 
on the implications of the courts’ failure to properly apply Chevron 
deference to EPA’s enforcement capabilities and what that means for 
the future of PSD. 
A. Case Law Analysis 
When concluding that violations of the PSD provisions are one-
time violations, the courts focus on statutory language. One example 
is the absence of the word “operate” from the statute and 
regulations.121 Section 7475 prohibits construction of a facility in 
violation of the requirements, but does not include the word 
“operation” in its directive.122 Courts have reasoned that if Congress 
intended for PSD violations to be continuing, the provision would 
contain operational requirements, not merely preconstruction 
requirements.123 To accomplish this feat, according to these courts, 
 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (interpreting the provision to not include operational requirements and 
therefore to not constitute a continuing violation for purposes of the SOL); New York v. 
Niagra Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660 (W.D.N.Y 2003). 
 120. See generally Lieben, supra note 14, at 699–705 (arguing that the statutory 
language, legislative history, and EPA regulations and guidance on PSD agree with the 
courts holding PSD violations as continuing); Cole, supra note 83 (discussing both sides of 
the debate and their analyses); Martin, supra note 103, at 587 (claiming that the 
construction of the statute and statutory and regulatory language demonstrate that the 
BACT requirement is separate from the permit requirement). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2012). 
 122. Homer City, 727 F.3d at 284 (stating that § 7475 “prohibits ‘construct[ing]’ a 
facility without obtaining a PSD permit or using BACT, and while ‘construction’ is defined 
to include ‘modifications’ . . . it does not include ‘operation.’ ”). 
 123. See id.  
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the statute should read, “[n]o major emitting facility . . . may be 
constructed or operate . . . .” Similarly, in the PSD enforcement 
provision, there is no mention of the CAA providing enforcement 
options against someone who “operates” a facility in violation of 
PSD.124 Section 7477 merely states that EPA can “take such 
measures . . . as necessary to prevent the construction or 
modification” of a facility.125 
Furthermore, the citizen suit provision—which allows individuals 
to bring suit for CAA violations—only authorizes a suit “against any 
person who proposes to construct or constructs” a facility in violation 
of PSD.126 The courts also point out that the PSD regulations likewise 
do not include “operation” in their directives.127 One PSD regulation 
states that “[a]ny owner or operator who constructs or operates a 
source or modification not in accordance with the [PSD] application 
submitted . . . or any owner or operator of a source or 
modification . . . who commences construction . . . without applying 
for and receiving approval . . . , shall be subject to appropriate 
enforcement action.”128 The first part of the regulation refers to 
facilities that properly received a PSD permit (referred to in the 
regulation as a PSD application)—incorporating all § 7475 
requirements, including BACT—and then violated that permit in 
some manner. In this regard, the regulatory language indicates that 
one cannot operate a facility contrary to the requirements set forth in 
the permit.129 The second part of the regulation deals with the 
situations discussed in this Comment—when an owner or operator 
fails to obtain a permit prior to commencing construction. In these 
situations, the regulatory language does not include the term 
“operation”; instead, it only explicitly prohibits construction of a 
facility without a permit.130 According to the courts’ argument, if EPA 
intended its regulations to provide for enforcement against those 
companies that operate facilities in violation of PSD, it should have 
included the word “operate” in the second half of the regulation.131 
 
 124. See 42 U.S.C. § 7477. 
 125. Id. (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. § 7604(a)(3). 
 127. See, e.g., Homer City, 727 F.3d at 287. 
 128. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(1) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. (stating that an owner or operator who constructs or operates a facility in 
violation of a permit is subject to enforcement actions). 
 130. Id. (stating that an owner or operator who constructs a facility without a PSD 
permit is subject to enforcement actions). 
 131. See, e.g., Homer City 727 F.3d at 287. 
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This argument also hinges on the fact that the word “operate” is 
included in other sections of the CAA.132 These courts believe that 
the absence of the word “operate” from the PSD provision evidences 
Congress’s intent to limit its effect.133 Therefore, the courts reasoned 
that since PSD does not include express operational conditions and 
other provisions do,134 Congress did not intend PSD to have 
operational requirements. However, this argument fails to take into 
account various reasons why Congress may have intentionally or 
unintentionally omitted the word “operate” from the statute. One 
possible reason is simple: Congress mistakenly failed to include the 
word “operate” in the PSD regulations. A similar unintentional 
omission of a word occurred during the drafting of CERCLA, where 
Congress used the phrase “owner and operator” in section 107(a)(1), 
while using the phrase “owner or operator” in the rest of the 
statute.135 In this instance, inclusion of the word “and” instead of “or” 
is generally considered a drafting mistake, and courts usually act as if 
section 107(a)(1) reads “owner or operator.”136 Alternatively, the 
word “operate” could have been intentionally omitted by Congress 
because, at the time of enactment, Congress did not consider the 
possibility that facilities would fail to obtain a PSD permit prior to 
construction and thereby operate in violation of the permit and other 
PSD requirements.137 
Another reason courts cite for the one-time violation conclusion 
relies on the actual structure of the statute. In particular, the PSD 
provision is located under a heading titled “Preconstruction 
 
 132. See id. at 285 (“[O]mission of any reference to ‘operation’ takes on dispositive 
significance given that other parts of the [CAA] establish operational conditions by 
‘employing plain and explicit language.’ ”); see also Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., 
615 F.3d 1008, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Thus, neither the statutory provision that creates the 
legal duty at issue here nor the provision for private enforcement gives any indication that 
the CAA imposes ongoing operational conditions under the PSD program.”); New York 
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 650, 661 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Section 
7475(a) therefore applies to the construction (including modification) of stationary 
sources, not to their operation.”). 
 133. See Homer City, 727 F.3d at 285 (“When Congress includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress 
acts intentionally and purposefully.”). 
 134. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661(f) (2012) (Title V Operating Permit). 
 135. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (using the phrase “owner or operator”) (emphasis 
added), with id. § 9607(a)(1) (using the phrase “owner and operator”) (emphasis added). 
See generally John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’S Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405 
(1997) (discussing the mistakes Congress made in drafting CERCLA).  
 136. See United States v. Md. Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577–78 (D. Md. 
1986). 
 137. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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requirements.”138 The courts have seized on this heading to conclude 
that the provision obviously does not include operational 
requirements because the title does not say so.139 Illustratively, 
according to the Third Circuit, § 7475 “does not exactly try to hide its 
exclusive link to construction and modification: after all, the section is 
titled ‘Preconstruction Requirements’—not ‘Preconstruction and 
Operational Requirements.’ ”140 Therefore, the courts conclude that 
Congress further demonstrated its intent for PSD not to include 
operational requirements by the structure of the statute.141 
Additionally, the courts conclude that the PSD provision does 
not contain any operational requirements independent from the PSD 
permit requirement.142 Looking again to the citizen suit provision, the 
CAA authorizes suits for violations of “an emission standard or 
limitation,”143 which is defined as, among other things, “any 
requirement to obtain a permit as a condition of operations.”144 This 
language supports the conclusion that BACT, as an emission standard 
or limitation, is a condition of operation that happens to be specified 
in the PSD permit. Despite the language in this definition, the Third 
Circuit stated that it “merely creates a private cause of action against 
a person who is required to (but does not) obtain a permit as a 
condition of operation. It does not say that PSD is, in fact, a condition 
of operation.”145 In other words, obtaining the permit itself is a 
condition of operation, but the PSD provision in its entirety—
including the BACT requirement—is not. This somewhat confusing 
explanation of “condition of operation” relies on the courts’ 
interpretation of the structure of § 7475 to mean that the technology 
requirements, such as BACT, are subsumed within the permit 
requirement.146 Hence, the PSD provision itself does not create 
 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 284 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The courts are relying on the construction aspects of the provision and 
interpreting the several operational aspects, such as the BACT requirement, as only 
provisions of the permit themselves that do not create any requirements outside of the 
permit. See infra text accompanying note 155. 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)(A). 
 144. Id. § 7604(f)(4) (emphasis added).  
 145. Homer City, 727 F.3d at 286. 
 146. See id. at 287–88; Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d 1008, 1016–17 (8th 
Cir. 2010). But see New York v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 650, 664–
65 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the statutory construction of § 7475 clearly contains eight 
separate requirements). 
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operational requirements; it is the permit that “sets some operating 
conditions.”147 Therefore, PSD does not “require[] a source without a 
permit to comply with operating conditions.”148 
To counter EPA’s claim that the operational requirements of 
§ 7475(a)(4) are not subsumed within § 7475(a)(1), the Third Circuit 
proclaimed that “Ockham’s Razor reminds us that simplicity in 
argument, without more, is no barometer of merit.”149 Apart from not 
actually explaining the court’s interpretation, the court’s assertion is 
also a misapplication of the principle. Contrary to the court’s 
statement, Ockham’s razor is a logical and scientific principle that 
states, all things being equal, the simpler explanation is usually 
correct.150 The court, without explanation, also stated that even 
though § 7475(a)(4)’s use of the present tense (a “proposed facility is 
subject to” BACT)151 appears to create an ongoing obligation, that 
appearance is incorrect.152 Rather, the requirement to install BACT is 
part of the “prohibition on construction—not operation.”153 
Finally, the one-time violation courts have refused to take into 
account public policy arguments because they believe—based on the 
above analysis—the statutory language is unambiguous.154 Although 
barely addressing155 Chevron v. NRDC,156 the courts appear to be 
 
 147. Homer City, 727 F.3d at 286.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See R.H. Helmholz, Ockham’s Razor in American Law, 21 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 
109, 110–11 (2006) (quoting the original principle as: “[P]lurality should not be assumed 
without necessity”). The original principle of Ockham’s Razor has been interpreted to 
mean that “[s]impler explanations are to be preferred.” Id. at 111. 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 152. See Homer City, 727 F.3d at 287 (stating that even though the “present-tense 
language might seem to create an ongoing obligation to use BACT regardless of a PSD 
permit’s terms or existence,” it does not because the statute does not include the term 
“operation”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 290–91 (stating that “§ 7475(a) unambiguously prohibits only 
constructing or modifying a facility without meeting PSD requirements.”); Sierra Club v. 
Otter Tail Power Co., 615 F.3d 1008, 1014 (8th Cir. 2010) (“This language unambiguously 
indicates that the PSD requirements are conditions of construction, not operation.”). 
 155. For example, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis did not discuss or cite to Chevron 
deference at all, even though it was analyzing EPA’s interpretation of the CAA, while the 
only discussion of Chevron deference in the Third Circuit’s opinion is in a footnote. See 
Homer City, 727 F.3d at 291 n.17. Furthermore, of the courts holding a one-time violation, 
see supra note 90 and accompanying text, only one mentioned Chevron deference; even 
then, it only was discussed for purposes of another statute. See United States v. Murphy 
Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1117 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (discussing the application of 
Chevron deference to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)). 
Similarly, only one of the two previous circuit court decisions holding a one-time violation 
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avoiding, without explanation, a policy and legislative history analysis, 
which should be conducted in a proper Chevron analysis.157 Under 
Chevron, an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute is given 
significant deference unless that interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.158 Under the doctrine, if 
Congress unambiguously addressed the precise question at issue, then 
the court must follow Congress’s intent (Chevron Step One 
Analysis).159 If, however, Congress was ambiguous or silent on the 
issue, the court must then decide whether the agency’s interpretation 
of the statute is reasonable (Chevron Step Two Analysis).160 It is at 
this stage that courts look to the legislative history and policy 
rationales of the statute to determine the reasonableness of the 
agency’s interpretation.161 In these cases, the courts used Chevron 
analysis as a means of undermining what it was created to protect—an 
agency’s interpretation of its governing statute. For example, without 
analyzing the legislative history, the Third Circuit stated that 
“[w]here, as here, the language of a provision . . . is sufficiently clear 
in context and not at odds with the legislative history . . . [there is no 
occasion] to examine the additional considerations of policy that may 
have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.”162 
Based on the above-mentioned interpretations, several courts 
have held that PSD violations are not continuing in nature and are 
therefore barred by the five-year SOL.163 A majority of courts that 
have addressed the issue have equated this broader holding with their 
more narrow conclusion that “failing to obtain a pre-construction 
permit is a single, discrete violation, and that the cause of action 
accrues on the day that the violation first occurs.”164 In doing so, these 
 
mentioned Chevron deference, and it did so in a footnote. See Sierra Club, 615 F.3d at 
1018 n.7. 
 156. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 157. The court, in Midwest Generation, completely fails to address the application of 
Chevron deference to the issue. See 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013). Although the courts in 
Homer City and Sierra Club do mention Chevron, their analyses were only contained in 
brief footnotes stating that the statutory language is unambiguous and therefore Chevron 
deference does not apply. See Homer City, 727 F.3d at 291 n.17; Sierra Club, 615 F.3d at 
1018 n.7; supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 159. Id. at 842–43 (describing what is now referred to as Step One analysis). 
 160. Id. at 843 (describing what is now referred to as Step Two analysis, or deference). 
 161. See id. at 851–52 (analyzing the legislative history and policy rationales of the 
governing statute). 
 162. See Homer City, 727 F.3d at 288 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 
522, 526 (1987)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 163. See Cole, supra note 83, at 186. 
 164. Id. (emphasis added). 
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courts have failed to take into account the operational components of 
a PSD violation—namely, the failure to install BACT. To reach the 
broader conclusion, however, the courts have distinguished 
preconstruction and operation permit violations.165 For example, the 
CAA’s Title V program consolidates all of a facility’s operational 
requirements into one operating permit, violations of which are 
ongoing.166 Contrarily, a PSD permit is violated “at the time of the 
construction, modification, or installation of the equipment or 
facility” and not during its subsequent operation.167 Since, as discussed 
above, the BACT requirements are considered subsumed within the 
permit requirements,168 courts need only look to the failure to obtain 
a permit and not to the failure to install BACT in order to determine 
if a violation is continuing.169 
Therefore, even though courts have conceded that the intent 
behind the CAA is air quality protection,170 they have nevertheless 
used the above-mentioned language and construction analyses to 
determine that the statute is unambiguous and therefore cannot be 
interpreted—in accordance with EPA’s claims—as creating a 
continuing violation.171 
B. Flaws in Reasoning / Chevron Analysis 
The courts’ analyses of the PSD provision and EPA’s 
interpretation of it should have followed the scheme set up in 
Chevron. Although some courts alluded to Chevron by stating that no 
further analysis is necessary when the language is unambiguous, this 
 
 165. See id. 
 166. Title V created a national operating permit program. Generally, it requires a 
consolidation of all of a facility’s CAA requirements into one document. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7661–7661(f) (2012). 
 167. Cole, supra note 83, at 186 (quoting United States v. Brotech Corp., 2000 WL 
1368023, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2000)). 
 168. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 169. This conclusion rests on the theory that the PSD provision requires a proposed 
facility be subject to BACT in order to even receive a permit before construction. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012) (“No major emitting facility . . . may be 
constructed . . . unless . . . the proposed facility is subject to the best available control 
technology for each pollutant.”). 
 170. E.g., Lieben, supra note 14, at 688 (“[A]lthough the underlying intent behind the 
[CAA], the EPA regulations, and the Illinois SIP is to assure continuing air quality, these 
provisions cannot reasonably be construed to mean that building or altering a machine 
without a permit is a violation that continues as long as the machine exists or is 
operated.”) (quoting United States v. Ill. Power Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (S.D. Ill. 
2003)). 
 171. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274 (3d 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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Comment argues that this conclusion, and the interpretations used to 
support it, are incorrect. Furthermore, the importance of Chevron 
analysis in this instance is well established and should have been 
conducted out in the open—not hidden in a vague footnote.172 
Through a proper Chevron analysis, this subpart explains why these 
courts’ interpretations fail to defer to EPA’s expertise and 
consequently do not follow the bounds of the doctrine set forth in 
Chevron. 
Under a traditional Chevron analysis, the first inquiry is whether 
Congress expressly addressed the precise question at issue.173 Here, 
the precise question is whether the PSD provision contains 
operational components separate from the permit requirement. There 
is a plausible argument that Congress unambiguously answered that 
question in the affirmative,174 based on the way it structured the PSD 
provision into eight separate and equal requirements.175 However, at 
the very least, the PSD provision contains some ambiguity because it 
apparently contains both operational and construction requirements 
but is located under the title “Preconstruction Requirements.”176 For 
example, the operational requirements—those that concern or have 
an effect on the operation of the facility—include the installation and 
maintenance of a pollution control measure (BACT),177 whereas the 
construction requirements—those that apply prior to or during the 
construction of the facility—include applying for and obtaining a 
preconstruction permit.178 Furthermore, the Third Circuit conceded 
 
 172. See Homer City, 727 F.3d at 291 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that deference is not 
warranted because the statute and regulations are unambiguous). 
 173. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 174. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 705 (“[T]he CAA is at worst ambiguous as to 
whether PSD requirements are ongoing and operational, and at best expressly establishes 
such obligations.”). 
 175. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2012). Congress, in drafting the provision, created eight 
requirements that must be met before construction may commence. Several of these 
requirements, including BACT, are operational in nature and therefore support the 
conclusion that PSD includes operational components. See supra note 60 and 
accompanying text. The argument claiming that PSD does not contain operational 
components relies on the incorrect conclusion that the BACT requirement is subsumed 
under the permitting requirement. 
 176. See 42 U.SC. § 7475. 
 177. See id. § 7475(a)(4) (“[T]he proposed facility is subject to the best available control 
technology for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from, or 
which results from, such facility . . . .” (emphasis added)). The “subject to” language used 
in the statute indicates that this requirement is imposed on the facility during its operation. 
Since a facility does not start emitting regulated pollutants (or any pollutants for that 
matter) until it begins operation, this statutory language would be meaningless if it did not 
apply to a facility’s operation. 
 178. See id. § 7475(a)(1) (setting forth the preconstruction permit requirement). 
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that there is “some evidence that whenever the topic of the PSD 
permitting process arose, Congress simply assumed that a PSD permit 
would be issued before construction or modification began.”179 
Congress’s assumption supports the conclusion that Congress did not 
explicitly address the possibility of construction or modification 
occurring without following the PSD requirements and therefore 
never addressed the question of a facility operating in violation of 
PSD. Congress seemed to stay silent, or at least was ambiguous, on 
this precise issue. 
Counterarguments to the courts’ interpretations also 
demonstrate an inherent ambiguity in the provision. For example, the 
courts’ fixation on the placement of the PSD provision under the title 
“Preconstruction Requirements” is conclusory. There is a valid 
argument that the title refers to the time at which PSD becomes 
applicable. Consequently, § 7475(a) can be viewed as a rule of timing 
that starts the PSD review process at the time of construction but 
does not necessarily restrict the provision’s application.180 
Furthermore, characterizing the PSD program as a “ ‘pre-
construction’ program overlooks the true nature of the program’s 
robust ongoing pollution-control requirements, or the program’s 
overall goals to maintain air quality.”181 If all eight of the 
requirements of § 7475(a) were only applicable prior to construction, 
then the purposes for which they were created—protecting air quality 
through emission controls and limitations—would be undermined; the 
only time a facility emits pollutants is during operation, and the 
emission controls would not be required during operation. Therefore, 
focusing on the “preconstruction” heading inaccurately restricts the 
intended application of PSD. Also, there is evidence that Congress 
did not intend to exclusively withhold operating requirements from 
the PSD provision.182 When Congress enacted the PSD provision, 
there were no other CAA provisions that dealt exclusively with 
 
 179. United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 289 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 180. According to the Third Circuit, this is the argument made by EPA in support of its 
position. Id. at 287. PSD review is the process by which a facility determines if it is subject 
to PSD requirements and, if so, how the facility will adhere to its requirements. See Martin 
supra note 103, at 572. 
 181. Lieben, supra note 14, at 697. 
 182. See id. at 692–93. See generally United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 
1329, 1355–56 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The CAA statutory scheme contemplates at least two 
different types of air permits unhappily named ‘preconstruction permits’ and ‘operating 
permits,’ with confusion easily resulting from the fact that the preconstruction permits 
often include limits upon a source’s operation.”). 
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operating conditions.183 The Title V operating provision—often used 
as evidence against the operational requirements of PSD184—was not 
enacted until 1990, and it is therefore entirely plausible that Congress 
intended for PSD to include operational requirements. A majority of 
courts addressing the issue are thus focusing exclusively on the 
aspects of PSD that create preconstruction requirements without 
giving any weight to “the language in the statute stating that the PSD 
permit shall set forth emission limitations for that source following 
the construction activity.”185 
For these reasons, the courts’ analyses should have continued to 
Chevron Step Two: Is EPA’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? 
Under a proper Chevron analysis, the term “reasonable” is treated 
very broadly, such that an agency’s interpretation is essentially upheld 
unless it is impermissible.186 At issue is EPA’s longstanding 
interpretation of the PSD provision as containing operational 
conditions and, therefore, violations of the provision are continuing in 
nature.187 
Many scholars and some courts believe PSD violations should 
not be barred by the SOL because they are continuous in nature.188 
This conclusion is based on the CAA’s statutory language and 
legislative history, EPA’s interpretation of the program, and certain 
policy rationales. The longstanding EPA interpretation of PSD is that 
EPA may pursue enforcement actions against facilities that operate in 
 
 183. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 706–07 n.297. 
 184. See id. at 706–07 (“Certain courts . . . have, in part, based decisions to dismiss PSD 
penalty claims on the theory that the violations are not ongoing because all operational 
requirements of the PSD program should be contained in the operating permit program of 
Title V of the CAA. [Therefore] . . . plaintiffs should be citing to Title V for continuous 
violations, rather than PSD requirements.”). 
 185. Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 650 
(M.D.N.C. 2003)). 
 186. See David Kemp, Chevron Deference: Your Guide to Understanding Two of 
Today’s SCOTUS Decisions, JUSTIA.COM: L., TECH. & LEGAL MARKETING BLOG (May 
21, 2012), onward.justia.com/2012/05/21/chevron-deference-your-guide-to-understanding-
two-of-todays-scotus-decisions/ (stating that the reasonableness standard “is a very low 
threshold of deference”); see also DANIEL T. SHEDD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43203, CHEVRON DEFERENCE: COURT TREATMENT OF AGENCY 
INTERPRETATIONS OF AMBIGUOUS STATUTES 6–7 (2013), available at 
https://mspbwatcharchive.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/chevron-deference-court-
treatment-of-agency-interpretations-of-ambiguous-statutes-aug-28-2013.pdf (“Oftentimes, 
in order to discern whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, a court will consider 
whether the agency’s position comports with the overall purpose and goal of the statute in 
question.” (emphasis added)). 
 187. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 704–07; Martin, supra note 103, at 565. 
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violation of PSD.189 To support this enforcement authority, EPA cites 
the Congressional Record.190 EPA uses the Congressional Record to 
both substantiate its interpretation of PSD and to demonstrate the 
reasoning behind Congress’ deliberate omission of the word 
“operate” from the CAA’s § 7477 enforcement provision.191 Congress 
omitted “operate” not because it wished to prohibit EPA 
enforcement of PSD violations, but because it believed that EPA 
already possessed enforcement authority.192 The record states that 
“the agreement recognizes existing law which allows EPA to initiate 
enforcement actions against sources that are being constructed or 
modified in violation of new source requirements, and leaves intact the 
current interpretation of the Agency that allows action against sources 
that are operating in violation of new source requirements.”193 Despite 
this unambiguous explanation of Congressional intent, recent court 
decisions do not view the statement as supporting EPA’s 
 
 189. The preamble to the PSD regulations, EPA’s past enforcement techniques, and 
EPA Guidance documents all evidence EPA’s interpretation that the PSD provision 
contains operational components (mainly that BACT is separate from the permit 
requirement), that PSD violations are continuing in nature, and that EPA can enforce 
against owners that operate a facility in violation of PSD requirements. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(n)(1)(iii) (2014) (stating that, in order to meet the BACT requirement, a source is 
required to submit a “detailed description as to what system of continuous emissions 
reduction is planned for the source or modification”); id. § 52.21(r)(1) (creating liability 
for any source that “constructs or operates a source or modification not in accordance” 
with PSD); 43 Fed. Reg. 26,380 (June 19, 1978) (“This preconstruction review in addition 
to limiting future air quality deterioration that required that any source subject to the 
requirements would apply [BACT].”); Memorandum from Michael S. Alushin, Assoc. 
Enforcement Counsel for Air, & Edward E. Reich, Dir. Of Stationary Source Compliance 
Div., Env’t Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Counsels Regions I-X, EPA (Dec. 14, 1983), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region7/air/nsr/nsrmemos/partc.pdf (“To allow commencement or 
continuation of operation out of compliance would defeat the intent of the Act by 
sanctioning levels of pollution in the PSD area greater than those established by Congress as 
the maximum allowable limits.” (emphasis added)); Memorandum from Stephen L. 
Johnson, Adm’r, Env’t Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Adm’rs (Dec. 18, 2008), available at 
http://epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf (“Under the federal 
PSD permitting regulations” specific facilities “are subject to the requirements of the PSD 
program, including the requirement to install the best available control technology . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Press Release, Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA Issues “Significant 
Deterioration” Regulations (Nov. 27, 1974), available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-
issues-significant-deterioration-regulations (“The [PSD] review is designed to insure that 
emissions from facilities will not violate the allowable deterioration increments and that 
[BACT] is employed.”).  
 190. See Brief for Respondent at 37–38, United States v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274 (2013) (No. 11-1302). 
 191. Homer City, 727 F.3d, at 285 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 192. Id. 
 193. 136 CONG. REC. S16933-53 (submitted by Sen. Chafee, covering Titles I, II, V, VI, 
and VII) (emphasis added). 
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interpretation.194 In Homer City, the Seventh Circuit stated, “[a]s is 
always the case with Congress’s rejection of an amendment, its 
meaning is elusive.”195 Although many scholars believe that statutory 
omissions cannot properly evidence congressional intent, the 
literature and case law suggest otherwise.196 Additionally, where 
Congress explains the reason for the omission—as is the case with 
PSD—that reason should be given effect.197 
In this circumstance, where EPA has consistently interpreted the 
CAA in a specific manner and Congress has acquiesced to that 
interpretation, courts should give EPA’s interpretation significant 
deference. Also, if EPA interpreted violations of the statute and the 
regulations as continuing violations, then there was no need for either 
EPA, in the regulations, or Congress, in the statute, to clarify that 
EPA could enforce against a facility for “operating” in violation of 
PSD. If EPA believed that a statute clearly gave it authority and 
Congress expressly left that interpretation intact,198 why would 
Congress act to clarify it? 
C. Undermining PSD 
The courts that have reached a continuing violation conclusion 
have, to an extent, used the “broad air quality goals of the CAA as a 
basis for their rulings.”199 During this stage of the Chevron analysis, 
 
 194. See, e.g., Homer City, 727 F.3d, at 286 n.15 (“But proof it is not.”). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Traditionally, legislative inaction was believed to contain no reliable interpretive 
value with regard to legislative intent. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative 
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 68 (1988–1989). Although that is often still the case, at 
times the Supreme Court is willing to apply several interpretive doctrines in order to 
determine the meaning behind legislative inaction. See id. at 69–88. One of these rules—
the acquiescence rule—states that if Congress does not overturn a judicial or 
administrative interpretation, then it probably acquiesces to it. Id. at 69. Furthermore, if 
Congress is made aware of an agency’s construction of a statute and has failed to take 
action against that interpretation, despite making other amendments to the statute, then 
the Supreme Court has been willing to attribute significance to legislative inaction. Id. at 
74. Considering the extreme contention and debate, even among Congress, concerning the 
PSD provision, there is not a plausible argument that Congress is unaware of EPA’s 
interpretations. When coupled with the fact that Congress has made a subsequent 
amendment to the CAA without altering PSD, it appears that the acquiescence rule could 
be used to shed some light on legislative intent. Although the Supreme Court has been 
inconsistent in its interpretation of legislative inaction, the acquiescence rule plus 
Congress’s express statement is more than sufficient to evidence its intent. 
 197. See id. at 69. 
 198. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (demonstrating Congress’s 
acquiescence to EPA’s interpretation that it can enforce against facilities that operate in 
violation of PSD). 
 199. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 671. 
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the court permissibly relied on Congress’s intent when enacting the 
statute.200 Since there is clear “legislative intent that the PSD 
requirements include operational requirements,”201 and because 
EPA’s interpretation adheres to this intent, there is no basis for 
courts to override it. Even though there is ample evidence that EPA’s 
interpretation is the correct interpretation, the court does not have to 
agree: Chevron only requires the agency’s interpretation to be 
“reasonable.”202  
The one-time violation courts should have conducted a full 
Chevron analysis and found that EPA’s interpretation satisfied the 
reasonableness standard.203 The judicial interpretations that led to the 
implied failure to pass (or even reach) Step Two of the Chevron 
analysis are inconsistent with the purpose of the PSD provision, its 
legislative history, and its longstanding interpretation by EPA. The 
PSD judicial trend and its subsequent application undermine the 
provision and the CAA as a whole.204 The PSD provision’s 
Congressional Declaration of Purpose includes a focus on the 
preconstruction review for issuing a permit.205 It states that a purpose 
of PSD review is to “assure that any decision to permit increased air 
pollution” is only made after “careful evaluation of all the 
consequences.”206 Taken together, the CAA’s overall purpose to 
“protect and enhance” air quality and the Declaration’s focus on the 
use of review and controls to maintain air quality207 provide a 
regulatory foundation for the PSD to allow industrial growth without 
sacrificing clean air.208 Recent cases undermine the stated purposes of 
 
 200. See SHEDD & GARVEY, supra note 186, at 6 (“[I]t is common practice to consider 
legislative history during the first step of the Chevron test.”). 
 201. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 701–03; supra Part III.B. 
 202. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A] court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”). 
 203. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 705. 
 204. The purpose of the CAA is to protect air quality and the purpose of the PSD 
provision is to protect air quality while allowing for industrial growth. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7470–7475 (2012). The goal of protecting air quality is frustrated when more sources are 
allowed to emit air pollutants (or current sources are allowed to increase their pollutants) 
without using appropriate control technologies. By interpreting violations of the PSD 
provision as a one-time violation, the courts are allowing for an increase in air pollution by 
sources intended to be limited by the PSD provision. 
 205. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Lieben, supra note 14, at 700 (“[T]he CAA’s PSD mandate is a broad and far-
reaching one to control air quality through proper source review and emissions controls.”). 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (“[T]o insure that economic growth will occur in a manner 
consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources.”). 
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PSD and the CAA by significantly diminishing—if not eliminating—
EPA’s ability to enforce against PSD violators, thereby allowing 
unfettered increases in emissions. Lack of proper enforcement 
increases incentives for owners or operators to make changes to their 
facilities without applying for a PSD permit or installing the proper 
control technology, as long as they can escape EPA detection for five 
years. 
The judicial trend also goes against the legislative history of the 
PSD provision. At the time of enactment, the country faced the 
dilemma of balancing the need for economic and industrial 
development with the concern over worsening air quality.209 A House 
Report demonstrates Congress’s intended solution by stating that 
“[t]he purpose of the [PSD] permit is to assure the allowable 
increments and allowable ceilings will not be exceeded as a result of 
emissions from any new or modified major stationary source.”210 The 
dual industrial and environmental benefits of the provision were 
further fortified when President Carter signed into law the 1977 
Amendments, which included the PSD provision. He proclaimed: 
With this legislation, we can continue to protect our national 
parks and our major national wilderness areas and national 
monuments from the degradation of air pollution. Other clean 
air areas of the country will also be protected, at the same time 
permitting economic growth in an environmentally sound 
manner.211 
The judiciary’s rejection of EPA’s interpretation not only 
undermines this solution212 but also fails to take into account the 
legislative history discussing the provision’s usefulness and purpose 
during a source’s operation. According to the House Report, the 
 
 209. See id.; Memorandum from David G. Hawkins, Assistant Adm’r for Air, Noise, 
and Radiation, EPA to Regional Adm’rs, I-X, EPA (Jan. 4, 1979) (“The primary purpose 
of BACT is to optimize consumption of PSD air quality increments thereby enlarging the 
potential for future economic growth without significantly degrading air quality.”), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/ttnnsr01/psd1/p8_8.html. 
 210. H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1087. 
 211. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Statement of Signing H.R. 6161 Into Law, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1460 (Aug. 8, 1977), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws 
/index.php?pid=7946&st=clean+air+act&st1=. 
 212. EPA’s interpretation that PSD contains operational requirements grants EPA 
authority to enforce against facilities that operate without a permit and BACT. This 
interpretation is consistent with the dual-approach of the PSD provision because it allows 
for economic growth so long as the facilities obtain a permit and apply specific control 
technologies necessary to protect air quality. By rejecting EPA’s interpretation, courts are 
essentially tipping the balance in favor of industry by allowing growth without 
contemporaneously limiting emissions. 
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focus of PSD is to establish emission limits through PSD review and 
permit conditions in order to protect air quality during the source’s 
operation.213 Additionally, the Joint Conference Report addressed the 
operational issue—when discussing the chance of construction of a 
source occurring without a permit, the Report stated that “a source 
cannot rely as a defense upon the actual construction by arguing that 
the source is somehow grandfathered due to the construction 
activity.”214 Accordingly, it is illogical to assume, as the court in 
Midwest Generation did, that a source could comply with the PSD 
requirements by installing BACT prior to construction and then 
immediately ripping it down.215 This practice—apart from being 
impractical and wasteful—does not accomplish the express goal of 
enhancing air quality and does not achieve the intent of Congress. 
Furthermore, the extreme expense involved in installing technology 
such as BACT makes it improbable that a facility would choose to 
install BACT merely to rip it down immediately afterwards. 
Finally, this judicial trend is contrary to long-held EPA 
interpretations of both the CAA and EPA’s own implementing 
regulations. EPA has always interpreted the PSD provision to include 
operational requirements.216 EPA did not expressly include 
operational language in its regulations because it believed that the 
regulation and the statute, as they stood, already included those 
requirements.217 For example, the PSD regulation’s “source 
obligation” section creates liability for any source which “constructs 
or operates a source or modification not in accordance” with PSD.218 
Moreover, the regulatory explanation of BACT includes operational 
emissions limits.219 In order to meet the BACT requirements, the 
regulations require a source to submit a “detailed description as to 
what system of continuous emissions reduction is planned for the 
source or modification.”220 Inclusion of the phrase “continuous 
emissions reductions” demonstrates EPA’s intent that BACT be 
 
 213. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1087. 
 214. H.R. Rep. No. 95-564, at 153 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1502, 1533. 
 215. United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2013) (“If 
the owners ripped out or deactivated the best available control technology after finishing 
construction that would not violation § 7475 . . . .”). 
 216. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1–9, United States v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 11-4406, 11-4407, 11-4408), 2013 WL 
595144; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1) (2013). 
 217. Lieben, supra note 14, at 704. 
 218. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(1) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 219. Lieben, supra note 14, at 704. 
 220. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(n)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). 
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applied throughout the source’s operation for two reasons. First, 
BACT has no purpose before a source begins operation. At this 
stage, the source has no emissions to reduce and, therefore, imposing 
BACT requirements would fail to serve the statutory provision’s 
purpose. Second, the term “continuous” refers to emission reductions 
that will occur unceasingly. This indicates that emissions-related 
requirements must extend beyond construction into the actual 
operation of the source. 
When one takes into account the PSD provision’s purpose, 
legislative history, and interpretations by EPA, only one question 
remains: What role has Chevron deference played in recent litigation? 
The courts should have applied a traditional Chevron analysis and 
upheld—under Step Two’s reasonableness standard—EPA’s 
interpretation of PSD requirements as ongoing and operational, and, 
therefore reasonable. Instead, courts departed from this Chevron 
analysis, coming to the opposite conclusion.221 The courts appear to 
be avoiding a full Chevron analysis by going through countless canons 
of “statutory interpretation” in order to conclude that the language is 
unambiguous.222 Interestingly, in these cases, courts are indirectly 
using a doctrine, originally created to defer to and protect an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation, to ultimately undermine not only the 
agency, but also the statutory provision itself. 
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The CAA gives EPA the authority to take enforcement action 
against a violator of any provision of a SIP- or EPA-issued permit.223 
For example, section 113 enforcement would come into play if a 
facility obtained a PSD permit, incorporated the permit into a state’s 
SIP, and then failed to comply with one of the permit’s conditions, 
including emission limitations.224 On the other hand, § 7475—in the 
PSD provision—authorizes EPA enforcement to “prevent the 
 
 221. Lieben, supra note 14, at 705 (“[T]he CAA is at worst ambiguous as to whether 
PSD requirements are ongoing and operational, and at best expressly establishes such 
obligations.”). 
 222. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 288, 
292 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing several interpretative canons, including: “ ‘[a] statute should be 
construed . . . so that no party will be inoperative or superfluous” and ejusdem generis—
the rule that a “ ‘series of specific terms . . . is confined to covering subjects comparable to 
the specifics it follows’ ”). 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (2012). 
 224. See 1970 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 113, 84 Stat. 1676, 1686–87, 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7413). 
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construction or modification” of a facility in violation of PSD.225 In 
general, CAA enforcement provisions allow for both civil penalties 
and injunctive relief.226 
Although the statute grants EPA these enforcement capabilities, 
the agency is faced with several practical limitations that affect its 
ability to enforce PSD. To begin with, PSD violators are extremely 
difficult to identify and catch because violators—usually large 
companies—often conceal potential violations.227 With the large 
number of sources potentially subject to PSD,228 EPA’s limited 
resources,229 and the statute’s focus on self-reporting,230 it is easy to 
understand how sources can fall through the cracks and fail to be 
discovered within five years. 
The high costs of complying with PSD create incentives for 
sources to hide or fail to report their potential qualifications for PSD. 
EPA is then faced with the task of identifying which facilities qualify 
for and are in violation of PSD. Information contained in the public 
record, however, is insufficient to identify violations.231 Therefore, 
EPA must often obtain nonpublic information to make these 
determinations.232 In this context, gathering information involves 
obtaining a significant amount of emissions data from sources, usually 
through section 114 information requests, and then having technical 
experts analyze the data.233 Even once a violation is discovered, 
litigation can be long and expensive.234 The settlement process alone 
 
 225. Id. § 7477. 
 226. Id. § 7413(b). 
 227. Lieben, supra note 14, at 680 (“Large companies owning major stationary air 
sources are typically sophisticated regarding regulatory requirements and often, whether 
intentionally or inadvertently, conceal PSD violations.”). 
 228. See Facilities and Enforcement Activities Related to the Clean Air Act Stationary 
Source Program, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/data/results/performance/ 
caa/index.html (last updated Mar. 19, 2014) (“As of March 2010, there are 14,795 active 
major sources, and 145,236 active synthetic minor and other minor sources (collectively 
referred to as non-major sources).”). 
 229. See Martin, supra note 103, at 618 (stating that a proactive search for PSD 
violators “would be overwhelmingly time-consuming and would require huge amounts of 
resources that are not available to EPA or the state agencies”). 
 230. See id. at 620 (discussing the problems associated with the CAA’s self-reporting 
mechanism); Clean Air Act Requirements, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/dfe/pubs/pwb/ 
tech_rep/fedregs/regsecta.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2013) (noting the self-reporting 
requirements of NSR permits). 
 231. See Cole, supra note 83, at 182 (“[T]he records that are used to discover violators 
often contain insufficient data to allow EPA to identify sources that meet the criteria of 
violating PSD.”); Martin, supra note 103, at 620. 
 232. Lieben, supra note 14, at 680. 
 233. Id. at 680–81. 
 234. Id. at 681.  
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can take years and if, after that time, an agreement cannot be 
reached, the litigation process would begin.235 Due to the costs 
involved, EPA generally attempts to settle the case with the facility.236 
However, if a settlement cannot be reached, a suit must be filed. 
Based on the above limitations, “[i]t is not difficult to envision why 
PSD lawsuits are often filed five years or more after the occurrence of 
construction, thereby laying the basis for defendants to argue the 
application of the statute of limitations.”237 
The recent judicial trend supports the argument that failure to 
obtain a PSD permit and install BACT is a one-time violation that 
accrues when construction commences.238 The SOL therefore begins 
to run immediately upon the initiation of construction, and suits must 
be brought within a five-year window. The PSD program relies on a 
system of self-reporting. It is the duty of the owner or operator to 
determine if their facility qualifies for PSD, conduct the review, and 
apply for a permit.239 Since the responsibility to report potential 
violations or apply for a permit falls on the facility and EPA 
practically cannot oversee this process, the added incentive of a finite 
SOL (one that accrues at the time of construction) means that 
facilities are more likely to conceal their violations. In reality, the case 
law now encourages facilities to disregard the PSD requirements as 
long as they can hide the construction or modification for five years. 
This encouragement essentially allows for perpetual violations of air 
pollution control requirements if the facility can manage to elude 
EPA for five years. 
Under the new judicial scheme, EPA will have to completely 
alter its enforcement strategy to maintain some enforcement 
authority over PSD violations.240 The courts, 
[b]y adopting an overly strict application of the statute of 
limitations . . . have “stripped” EPA of its ability to collect fines 
 
 235. Id. at 681–82. 
 236. Cf. Memorandum from Michael S. Alushin, supra note 189, at 8 (“In civil actions 
filed under both § 167 and § 113, against pre-operationals as well as post-operational 
sources, a likely outcome of the actions will be consent decrees.”); SUEDEEN G. KELLY, 
WHITE PAPER: EPA ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES AND PROPOSED RULES AFFECTING 
THE ELECTRIC GENERATING SECTOR 4 (2011), available at http://www.pattonboggs.com/ 
ViewpointFiles/c692af2b-697e-4893-87ef-0003f67633a8/Kelly_White%20Paper.pdf (“In the 
face of costly and contentious litigation, a number of utilities have settled with the United 
States.”).  
 237. Lieben, supra note 14, at 682.  
 238. See supra Part III.A.   
 239. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2012). 
 240. See Cole, supra note 83, at 183 (stating that the current PSD case law has 
“significantly interfered with EPA’s PSD enforcement efforts”). 
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and have removed EPA’s “leverage for obtaining . . . early 
settlements . . . as defendants may believe they have better 
chances of obtaining no or small penalties if they actually 
litigate the claims.”241 
Faced with this reality, EPA may also be less willing to conduct 
time-consuming negotiations due to a fear of the SOL running.242 
Consequently, they may be quicker to bring suits without having fully 
solidified the case and, thus, will be less likely to win.243 
The Third Circuit provided a potential solution to the impending 
enforcement consequences of its holding: increased reliance on 
section 114 information requests.244 According to the court, EPA can 
and should use its section 114 abilities to request the pertinent 
information from virtually all facilities.245 In support for this idea, the 
court stated that 
sources are not required to report or obtain a PSD permit for 
routine maintenance that they believe falls below a “major 
modification.” But that does not consign the EPA to playing 
whack-a-polluter by guessing which sources should be the 
target of its enforcement efforts. The EPA is statutorily 
empowered to require any source owner or operator, regulated 
party, or any person “who the Administrator believes may have 
information necessary” for implementing the Clean Air Act 
and determining violations—that is nearly anyone in the United 
States—“on a one-time, periodic, or continuous basis” to keep 
records, make reports, and submit to inspections, monitoring, 
and emissions sampling, and “provide such other information as 
the Administrator may reasonably require.”246 
The court continued by concluding that “[g]iven the breadth of 
these powers, we see no reason why EPA and States lack authority to 
require the advance reporting of some or all proposed changes to 
 
 241. Id. (quoting Lieben, supra note 14, at 699). 
 242. See Dawn Reeves, Ruling Expected to Curtail EPA’s NSR Enforcement Against 
Energy Sector, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, July 29, 2013, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
CARCON0020130729e97t0000k (stating that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling “makes it less 
likely that EPA would be interested in settlement discussion in lieu of a lawsuit due to the 
five-year time limit to file a case”). 
 243. See id. (questioning whether the outcome may “force [EPA] to bring suit earlier 
or when they might not have done so. . . . It might force the United States to litigate before 
it has settled a matter for fear of letting the statute of limitations run”) (quoting United 
States v. Midwest Generation, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 244. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 289 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
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facilities, whether or not they rise to a modification.”247 This 
interpretation of EPA’s authority, although technically correct, fails 
to take into account the practical implications of doing as the court 
says as well as other federal laws prohibiting such action.248 The 
argument is not that EPA lacks the authority under the CAA to issue 
114 requests to all facilities, but rather that it lacks the practical 
capacity to do so.249 The immense number of facilities plus the 
possibility of multiple modifications at each facility, coupled with the 
lack of EPA manpower and resources would create an administrative 
nightmare. It is not practical, and arguably not possible, for EPA to 
inspect all these facilities, create and send out all these requests, and 
then analyze the resulting data within any useful time frame. 
Additionally, EPA is constrained by federal laws such as the 
Paperwork Reduction Act,250 which places a limitation on EPA’s 
ability to send the same request to more than ten individuals or 
facilities.251 
In order to follow the suggestion of the Third Circuit, EPA 
would need to substantially increase its manpower. This addition 
further requires an act of Congress to increase EPA’s budget and 
resources—a situation which is not likely to occur anytime soon.252 
Even with increased resources and manpower, EPA would need to 
create a system to filter and organize the different sources potentially 
subject to PSD requirements so that section 114 requests could be 
sent out to the highest number of facilities at the earliest possible 
time. EPA would also have to find a loophole to the Paperwork 
Reduction Act, without significantly increasing their already-heavy 
workload. EPA’s lack of resources, inability to comply with the Third 
Circuit’s suggestions, and difficulty identifying violators in the first 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 
(codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2012)) (placing significant restrictions and 
administrative burdens on an agency’s ability to send out information requests). 
 249. See id.; Martin, supra note 103, at 618 (commenting on EPA’s scarce resources). 
 250. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2012). 
 251. Summary of the Paperwork Reduction Act, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-paperwork-reduction-act (last updated July 10, 2014) (“The 
[Paperwork Reduction] Act generally provides that every federal agency must obtain 
approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before using identical 
questions to collect information from 10 or more persons. If EPA decides to gather 
information, we must prepare an Information Collection Request (ICR), which: 
[d]escribes the information to be collected, [g]ives the reason the information is needed, 
and [e]stimates the time and cost for the public to answer the request.”). 
 252. See EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget 
/budget (last updated Mar. 4, 2014) (demonstrating the dramatic decrease in EPA’s budget 
and workforce from the 2012 to 2013 fiscal year). 
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place combine to drastically impair EPA’s ability to enforce against 
PSD violators. 
CONCLUSION 
Faced with the realities of Homer City and Midwest Generation, 
few options remain for EPA to take enforcement action against PSD 
violations. One possibility, asserted by the Third Circuit in Homer 
City, is criminal prosecution.253 This, however, is also an impractical 
solution. Due to the complexities involved in criminal prosecution for 
PSD violations,254 EPA’s criminal department has not brought any 
criminal violations for PSD.255 Obtaining injunctive relief is 
technically still an option for EPA, but the implications of Homer 
City and Midwest Generation are far reaching and at least suggest that 
this is no longer an option. As a result, EPA would have to rely on 
distinguishing the Seventh and Third Circuits’ opinions based on the 
fact that they dealt with successor liability and then only attempt 
enforcement against sources that have not changed hands. 
Unfortunately, regaining enough enforcement capabilities to 
ensure proper compliance with PSD and therefore “protect and 
enhance” air quality seems unlikely after these recent holdings. EPA 
filed for a rehearing and rehearing en banc in Midwest Generation, 
both of which were denied.256 EPA did not file for rehearing in Homer 
City. At this point, the ninety-day period in which to petition the 
Supreme Court for certiorari has passed for both cases. EPA could 
wait for a subsequent similar circuit court holding and then file for 
certiorari; however, at that point making the case of a valid circuit 
split will be difficult. In all likelihood, EPA did not petition for 
certiorari because of the fear of a negative decision. Without a 
Supreme Court decision, there is still the hope that other Circuits will 
align their decisions with EPA’s past interpretations and that EPA 
will therefore be better equipped to make a claim before the Supreme 
 
 253. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 288–89 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
 254. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, The Public Health Aspects of Environmental 
Enforcement, 4 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEATH L. 1 (2010) (discussing the heightened intent 
requirement when pursuing criminal enforcement under the CAA).  
 255. A search using EPA’s “Summary of Criminal Prosecutions” database for various 
combinations of PSD search terms and specific searches for each individual provision 
within Title I, Part C (Prevention of Significant Deterioration), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7479, 
7491–7492, resulted in zero hits. See Summary of Criminal Prosecution, EPA.GOV, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm.  
 256. United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013), reh’g & 
reh’g en banc denied.  
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Court. As it is now, however, EPA does not have much support in the 
case law.257 Additionally, even though a negative decision may alert 
Congress to clarify their intent in the PSD provision, there is often a 
concern among environmentalists of opening up these controversial 
and very complicated statutes to a Congress that is not necessarily 
friendly on environmental issues. 
Finally, congressional action clarifying the operational and 
ongoing nature of the PSD provision would finally answer the 
continuing violation question. Congressional action, however, would 
require another amendment to the CAA. With the current state of 
congressional decision making, it is not likely that an amendment will 
occur.258 Further, opening up the CAA to an amendment could create 
negative consequences.259 There is a legitimate fear that it would lead 
the way to massive statutory changes and a realignment of the Act’s 
goals.260 Similarly, EPA could decide to promulgate new regulations 
 
 257. Even though there is some argument that a circuit split exists over the continuing 
violation PSD issue, the period for EPA to petition the Supreme Court for review has 
already passed on both circuit court cases discussed in this paper. If EPA chose to take the 
case to the Supreme Court it would need to wait for another adverse circuit court decision. 
However, an additional adverse opinion would bring the total of one-time violation circuit 
courts to five, whereas only one circuit has held these violations to be ongoing. See supra 
notes 92–94 and accompanying text. At that point, the judicial trend will more clearly 
favor the one-time violation argument and would therefore decrease the argument of a 
valid circuit split. Additionally, some commentators view the recent cases more narrowly, 
thereby asserting that a circuit split does not even exist for this particular issue. See Seth 
Jaffe, The Final Nail in the Coffin on EPA’s Enforcement Initiative Against Historic PSD 
Violations? The Third Circuit Agrees that PSD Violations Are Not Ongoing, L. & THE 
ENV’T BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2013/08/23/the-final-
nail-in-the-coffin-on-epas-enforcement-initiative-against-historic-psd-violations-the-third-
circuit-agrees-that-psd-violations-are-not-ongoing/ (“Even if DOJ were to seek Supreme 
Court review, it’s not obvious that they’d get it. There is no circuit split and the issue 
seems to be a plain vanilla piece of statutory construction. There may be a lot at stake for 
EPA, but I don’t think that the Supreme Court would say that there is anything with 
which it must grapple.”).  
 258. See Frank James, Lawmakers in Name Only? Congress Reaches Productivity 
Lows, NPR BLOG (Dec. 3, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/12/ 
03/248565341/lawmakers-in-name-only-congress-reaches-productivity-lows (comparing the 
low number of laws passed by the current Congress with the “do-nothing” 80th Congress, 
which passed 906 laws). 
 259. See Heather L. Ross, Clean Air—Is the Sky the Limit?, RESOURCES, Spring 2001, 
at 13, 16, available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-Resources-143-cleanair.pdf 
(discussing how opening up the CAA to “extenuating amendments” can result in “genuine 
harm” to the statute). 
 260. With a relatively unsympathetic Congress, environmentalists may have valid 
concerns over the potential environmentally harmful results that may result from 
congressional action on the various environmental statutes. Cf. Suzanne Goldenberg, Last 
Congress Was Most Hostile to Environmental Causes, Say Activists, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/feb/20/congress-low-score-league-
of-conservation-voters (discussing the League of Conservator Voters’ report card on 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 821 (2015) 
862 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
that reinforce and expressly state its enforcement capabilities. 
However, based on the recent judicial interpretations of the statute, 
any new EPA regulations would likely face suits by industry forces 
claiming that the new regulations are “not in accordance with law,” as 
required under the Administrative Procedure Act.261 Despite this fact, 
regulatory clarification is likely the best option EPA has to ensure 
that the courts enforce its interpretation. 
Unfortunately, environmentalists and the industrial sector are 
fighting a hard battle because of their perception that their interests 
are mutually exclusive. This perception, however, is not true. The 
PSD provision itself was an attempt to meet the goals of both sides by 
allowing for and promoting economic growth while also protecting 
the nation’s air quality.262 By essentially condoning sources’ perpetual 
and unregulated emissions (as long as they elude EPA for at least five 
years), the courts are tipping the scales heavily in favor of industrial 
growth. The incorrect interpretations taken by recent circuit courts 
undermine the purpose of the CAA, the goal of PSD, and EPA’s 
ability to take enforcement action against violators. These 
interpretations led to a skewed attempt to apply Chevron in a manner 
that circumvents EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act’s 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration provision. 
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environmental issues based on “dozens of votes in the House to dismantle the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s authority, defund climate science education, weaken 
drinking water standards, open up the Arctic for drilling, remove protections for 
endangered sea turtles and fast-track the Keystone XL pipeline project, among other 
issues”).  
 261. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012). 
 262. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (2013) (stating that the purpose of the provision is “to insure 
that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing 
clean air resources”). 
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